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I. Introduction 
 
     “Anyone who says to another ‘you fool’ is in danger of the fire of hell,” warns Jesus in the 
Gospel of Matthew (Mt. 5:22). 
     On the face of it, this seems excessive to say the least. Who of us has not, at one time or 
another, said or thought something contemptuous of someone else? Here the punishment seems 
so wildly out of proportion to the crime as to eclipse our dismay over the crime itself. Even if we 
concede that it is a bad thing to disparage others, certainly it is not so bad as to make one 
deserving of the fires of hell. What can Jesus mean? 
     Much depends here on how we interpret the phrase “the fire of hell.”  If we take it to refer to a 
punishment deliberately crafted and imposed by a divine Potentate, then it is hard to see this 
statement as anything but monstrously extreme: What sort of being would inflict such horrific 
punishment for such a minor offense? But if we understand it to allude to the misery and 
heartache we inflict upon one another when we act in offensive ways, we can, perhaps, make 
more sense of it. Jesus is saying that the contempt expressed in such utterances as “you fool” lies 
at the very heart of what is morally offensive. 
     The purpose of my essay is to explore this ‘heart’ of moral offense. I have entitled it “The 
Mystical Element in Moral Offense” because of my sense that something mysterious is going on 
in both our tendency to take offense and to give it, something that points us to the very core of 
human existential concern. The following essay is an effort to glimpse this mystical element. 
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II. Moral Offense 
     Why do we take offense?  
     Moral violation often takes the form of subjecting another to material harm, and this might 
lead us to suppose that it consists essentially in the material harm done. But the more we reflect 
on the matter, the more we realize that this is not the case; for we might suffer the very same 
harm through nature or accident without feeling morally offended. If my property is destroyed in 
an accidental fire, I suffer harm but no offense. If my property is stolen by another, I am 
offended. As Oliver Wendell Holmes remarked, “Even a dog distinguishes between being 
stumbled over and being kicked.”1 But wherein lies the difference?  
     Moral offense is always a response to mistreatment by others. But even the word 
‘mistreatment’ can be misleading here, for the offense consists not so much in the treatment 
suffered as in what the treatment betokens – the disregard, the blindness, the callous indifference 
of the other to our own fundamental well-being.   
     But here we encounter a mystery. Why should we care if the other is indifferent to us so long 
as our tangible needs and wants are satisfied? Again, we cannot say it is because we need respect 
from others for our material support, for this, again, would reduce moral offense to a reaction to 
material harm. But we see that this is not what it is. It must be that we demand respect from 
others for its own sake, i.e., that such respect is desired as a primary good. 
     To explore why this might be so, we will look at two accounts of human interrelation that 
complement one another in significant ways.  The first is given by Arthur Schopenhauer in his 
work On the Basis of Morality, the second by Paul Tillich in his Love, Power, and Justice. 
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III. Schopenhauer and the Egoic Self  
     Schopenhauer writes:  
The chief and fundamental incentive in man as in the animal is egoism . . . By its nature, 
egoism is boundless; man has the unqualified desire to preserve his existence, to keep it 
absolutely free from pain and suffering, which includes all want and privation. . . 
Everything opposing the strivings of his ego excites his wrath, anger, and hatred, and he 
will attempt to destroy it as his enemy. . . Egoism is colossal; it towers above the world; 
for if every individual were given the choice between his own destruction and that of the 
rest of the world, I need not say how the decision would go in the vast majority of cases. 
Accordingly, everyone makes himself the center of the world, and refers everything to 
himself.2  
     As Schopenhauer presents it, egoism lies at the core of human motivation; our desire for self-
preservation and self-advancement is fundamental. We are all fundamentally concerned for 
ourselves. But, as Schopenhauer also points out, such egoism is not primarily a moral 
disposition. It is first and foremost ontological; that is to say, it is a function of the ontological 
individualization that allows each of us to be a discrete self, distinct from others. As discrete 
beings, our interests and concerns are separated from one another. If I get a cold, you do not 
sneeze. If you have a toothache, I do not cry “Ouch!” Hence, I am naturally more concerned with 
my cold and my toothache than with yours. This is egoism. Egoism, writes Schopenhauer, “is due 
ultimately to the fact that everyone is given to himself directly, but the rest are given to him only 
indirectly through their representation in his head; and this directness asserts its right. . . 
Accordingly, everyone is all in all to himself.”3 
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     All immorality is dependent on this natural, ontological, individualization whereby one 
person’s “weal and woe” (as Schopenhauer puts it) is isolated from the weal and woe of others, 
such that it is possible for one person to pursue her interests, her “weal,” in complete disregard of 
the interests of others.  This ontological individualization creates an experiential chasm between 
one’s awareness of self and one’s awareness of other, a chasm that grounds the very possibility 
of immorality; for if we had to experience others’ woe as we do our own, we would, by that fact 
alone, be as careful of others’ interests as we are of our own. Of course, this is a simple 
tautology, for then the interests of the other would be our own.  
     At first blush we might suppose moral offense to be, essentially, an egoistic response. The 
offended party is responding to some harm done to herself or a loved one, and becomes offended 
as a self-protective reaction arising out of self-concern.  
     But if we are right in understanding moral offense to be, at base, a reaction, not to the harm 
done by another, but to the indifference or contempt shown by the other, then in the response of 
moral offense we discover something paradoxical: The morally offended party is offended, not 
so much by the actions of the other, as by the egoism of the other itself.   
     In other words, at the core of moral offense is an objection to the other’s egoic isolation. The 
morally offended person demands that the other transcend his or her egoic self-regard and 
demonstrate some degree of care for the offended party.  It is not the harm done per se, but the 
other’s lack of care that is so objectionable. That this doesn’t always translate into an objection 
to one’s own egoism is, of course, part of the human moral predicament. We will have more to 
say about this below. Nevertheless, morality as such seems to be rooted in the paradoxical 
demand of the ego that egoism itself – at least the egoism of others – be overcome.  
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     And, indeed, we find this demand echoed in virtually all moral systems. Each of them 
demands a piercing of the egoic veil that isolates us from others and makes possible our 
disregard of them. We are directed to take an interest in the interests of the other, to act as if our 
egoic self-containment were lifted and the other’s concerns as immediately present to us as our 
own. This demand finds one of its most succinct expressions in the biblical command to “love 
your neighbor as yourself.” 
     Schopenhauer describes the transcendence of egoism implicit in moral demands in this way:  
 
How is it possible for another’s weal and woe to move my will immediately, that is to 
say, in exactly the same way in which it is usually moved only by my own weal and woe? 
. . . Obviously, only through that other man’s becoming the ultimate object of my will in 
the same way as I myself otherwise am, and hence through my directly desiring his weal 
and not his woe just as I ordinarily do only my own. But this necessarily presupposes 
that, in the case of his woe as such, I suffer directly with him, I feel his woe just as I 
ordinarily feel only my own . . . this requires that I am some way identified with him, in 
other words, that this entire difference between me and everyone else, which is the very 
basis of my egoism, is eliminated.4 
  
     Inherent to the moral urge, in other words, is the demand that our ontological 
individualization and isolation, which is the basis of our egoism, be somehow penetrated and 
opened. Underlying morality is the drive, not simply to be treated well, but to transcend the 
alienation from others that our ontological individualization imposes. 
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     What is the basis of this drive? Why do we feel it so urgently? To explore these questions let 
us look at Paul Tillich’s ontology of love as he presents it in his work, Love, Power, and Justice. 
 
IV. Love as the Reunion of the Separated 
     In Love, Power, and Justice Tillich presents an ontological analysis of the impetus to love.   
“Love. . . ,” writes Tillich, “drives everything that is towards everything else that is. . . Love is 
the drive towards the unity of the separated. Reunion presupposes separation of that which 
belongs essentially together.”5   
     Tillich’s ontology posits an original Unity underlying our egoic separateness, a Unity to 
which we all natively belong and to which we all long to return. As a result, our egoic isolation is 
experienced by us as the privation of a more primordial togetherness.  To put it another way: the 
veil of individualization that separates and hides us from one another, also deprives us of one 
another. This deprivation is something felt, in the desperation of loneliness, the anguish of 
rejection, the pangs of grief, and, quite sharply, in the sting of moral offense. In the moral 
demand, we require that the other see us, acknowledge us, be there with us in our self-concern. A 
world in which we are left entirely alone with our self-concern would be one in which we suffer 
a great deprivation, even if all our material wants are satisfied.      
     It is this privation, and our desire to overcome it, that undergirds the drive for love. Tillich 
writes: “Love reunites that which is self-centered and individual. . . It is the fulfillment and the 
triumph of love that it is able to reunite the most radically separated beings, namely individual 
persons.”6     
      In moral offense, then, we experience (in negative image, so to speak) our drive toward this 
mysterious – we might now say mystical – Unity. Suggested here is that the egoism of which 
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Schopenhauer writes is, in some sense, ontologically superficial. Deeper than our egoic 
separateness is a more primordial Unity from which we are, for the most part, estranged, but with 
which we long to reunite. Tillich writes, “Separation presupposes an original unity. Unity 
embraces itself and separation.”7 The sense of radical self-enclosure of which Schopenhauer 
writes, thus, results from our failure to recognize, or somehow experience, this primordial Unity. 
In the Eastern mystical traditions this failure is dubbed Ignorance (avidya). Ignorance here is not 
primarily a cognitive category; it is the failure to experience our rootedness in the universal 
ontological ground.   
     And yet there remains a puzzle. In the phenomenon of moral offense we see, so to speak, 
egoism’s objection to egoism – but not necessarily to its own egoism; it is egoism’s objection to 
the egoism of the other. Although the morally offended person demands the elimination of the 
other’s egoistic disregard, she does not necessarily demand the same of herself. Why not? If the 
ego’s drive is for communion with the other, why do we so often take delight in saying to 
another: “you fool”?  
 
V. Two Modes of Reunion  
     If, with Tillich, we define love as “the drive toward the unity of the separated” then we must 
recognize that there is – to employ a Jungian figure – a shadow side to love.  This shadow of 
love finds expression in the legends of both the Buddha and the Christ.   
     It is said that at the birth of the Buddha a seer prophesied that he would become either a great 
spiritual sage or a great world conqueror. Buddha becomes the Buddha only by rejecting the 
latter course and following the former. A somewhat similar story is told of Jesus: During his 
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sojourn in the desert Satan promises him dominion over all the earth if he will but bow down to 
and worship Satan. Jesus fully becomes the Christ only in rejecting the offer.  
     These legends suggest that there are two paths by which humans seek to overcome the 
deprivation of egoic separation: the path of conquest and the path of love. The conqueror too 
seeks unity with the other, but it is a unity of domination. The conqueror seeks to fill the void of 
his egoic isolation through subsumption of all otherness into himself. The conqueror seeks to 
control the other, dominate the other, and thereby appropriate the other to himself. This is the 
shadow of love. 
     All the great spiritual traditions teach that this path of conquest is ultimately self-defeating; 
the apparent unity achieved thereby is illusory. But we must not be too quick to dismiss the 
satisfaction it affords. The I’s conquest of the not-I, and of the anxiety aroused by it, can be both 
thrilling and gratifying. The aim of the conqueror is to bring the world under the dominion of the 
I, the ego, and thereby eliminate the threat that duality poses. Ontologically, of course, this is an 
impossible task, for the realm of the not-I is limitless; nevertheless, the feeling that progress 
toward this goal is being made is exhilarating. It is only upon suffering defeat, or when there is 
nothing left to conquer, that the futility of the pursuit becomes evident. 
     What this implies is that the root of what we call “good” and what we call “evil” is actually 
the same. Both are rooted in the drive to overcome egoic isolation.  
     And yet there is a profound difference between the two. The drive for love (let us call it the 
agapic drive) and the drive for conquest (let us call it the hegemonic drive) do not operate on the 
same ontological level. The agapic person seeks communion with the Unity underlying 
separation; for that very reason she does not seek to destroy separation itself. The truly agapic 
person respects the world in its plurality and differences. As Tillich puts it: “It is the superiority 
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of the [agapic] person-to-person relationship that it preserves the separation of the self-centered 
self, and nevertheless actualizes their reunion in love.”8 The hegemonic person, in contrast, seeks 
to smash through the walls of separation so as to make the other an object of her own egoic will. 
The agapic person seeks unity at a level transcendent of, but also respectful of, the other’s ego. 
The hegemonic person seeks unity through bringing all other egos under the dominion of her 
own. In Western religious mythology this hegemonic drive is represented by the figure of Satan, 
who seeks to give to his own ego the status of God.     
     In this context, we might distinguish between two species of offense: true moral offense and 
what we might now call “prideful offense.” Prideful offense is a hegemonic response to 
opposition; moral offense is an agapic response to exclusion. The morally offended person seeks 
justice; i.e., a restoration of mutually caring relations. The pridefully offended person seeks 
vengeance; i.e., a reversal of power relations.  
     What we see in concrete life, however, is often a confusion and conflation of the two. The 
drive for love and the drive for hegemony are intermingled in complex ways, as are the 
responses of moral and prideful offense. We can gain further insight by examining the nature of 
this confusion.   
 
VI. Ignorance and Offense  
     Let us return to an earlier point: At the basis of our sense of egoic isolation – and hence, at the 
basis of both moral and prideful offense – is what the Eastern traditions call avidya (Ignorance); 
i.e., our failure to experience (“know”) the Unity that is our ontological ground.  
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     Alienation from this ground is experienced as a fundamental threat – the threat of isolation, 
exclusion, radical aloneness – to which we respond with the drive for union with the not-I, a 
drive that can take one of two basic forms: agapic or hegemonic.    
     We respond with offense (among other negative feelings) when thwarted in this drive.  Thus, 
in the response of offense we see a trace – a spark or token – of the drive for union with our 
ontological basis (in religious terms: God or Brahman, or whatever we wish to call it).  This 
drive for Unity is what we have called the mystical element in moral offense. 
     But this mystical element will be hidden from us in direct proportion to our Ignorance. To the 
extent that we are out of touch with the Unity underlying separation we will tend to feel 
threatened by separation – otherness – itself. And this sense of threat will tend to lead us in a 
hegemonic direction, for in our Ignorance we know of no other way to overcome our 
separateness than through expanding the domain of the ego.  In this way the moral urge itself, the 
urge for unity with others, is corrupted into the hegemonic drive.  
     And this brings us back to an earlier point: In the response of moral offense we see the ego’s 
objection, not to egoism as such, but to the egoism of the other. It is the other’s egoic disregard 
that is offensive to me (not my own). It is the other’s ego that I wish to modify (not my own). 
Much of what we commonly call moral offense, thus, is really a confused admixture of moral 
and prideful offense. My egoism demands that you desist from your egoism. If you do not, I am 
offended, but my offense has a prideful taint that becomes a barrier to true reconciliation. Our 
cries for justice are laced with a lust for vengeance; our moral righteousness is permeated with a 
prideful self-righteousness. As a result, my offense at you triggers your offense at me, and there 
we remain, in mutual offense, suspended in irreparable discord.  Our very offense offends.    
    Is there a way out of this dilemma?  
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     The great spiritual traditions present an answer by showing us the way moral offense is 
transformed in one who has passed beyond Ignorance. 
    The figures of Buddha and Jesus are among the most prominent representatives of the spiritual 
gnosis that is the counter to spiritual Ignorance. In both figures we see an ability to respond to 
moral violation, not with unmitigated offense, but with compassion, forgiveness, and a call for 
reconciliation. Jesus’ forgiveness of his crucifiers from the Cross is perhaps the most striking 
instance of this. What allows for such extraordinary graciousness?       
     What we see in such spiritually enlightened figures is that their experience of the Unity that 
underlies separation affords them an equanimity unavailable to the Ignorant. They do not 
experience moral violation as a threat to their very being, for they experience themselves as 
rooted in an ultimate Unity that cannot be destroyed by such violation. Thus, they are able to 
stand back and see the tragic Ignorance that gives rise to moral violation, and see, as well, that 
underneath all violation is a deeper longing for communion. Thus, even as he is dying in torment 
on the Cross, Jesus is able to say, “Father forgive them, they know not what they do.”  His ability 
to forgive his tormentors is not simple magnanimity on his part; it is also the expression of his 
longing to be reunited with them in the very love upon which they are now (ignorantly, 
tragically) trampling. 
     This does not mean that moral violation is not taken seriously. Forgiveness of moral violation 
is not dismissal of it. Even for one who has passed beyond Ignorance, the threat that moral 
violation poses remains serious. All the great spiritual traditions acknowledge this. Without 
moral regard, human life is degraded and miserable. The moral demand is an urgent one for 
human life at both the individual and the societal levels. But the overcoming of Ignorance 
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changes the character of moral offense in a fundamental way, in a way that eliminates the 
tendency of offense to itself become offensive.  
     What this implies is that there are more and less enlightened ways to be offended. Offense 
will manifest itself differently depending upon one’s level of spiritual maturation. Let us, then, 
look at these levels more carefully.  
 
VII.  Stages of Moral Maturation  
     Let us call the ethical status of one who has passed beyond Ignorance, theonomous.    
We take the term theonomous from Tillich, who coined it to refer to the moral-spiritual state of 
one whose actions are governed by the law (nomos) arising from the immanent experience of the 
Unity that underlies separation (theos). Such a one has overcome the sense of egoic isolation that 
tends to make desperate our need for others, a desperation that conditions the hegemonic drive. 
Such a person’s response to moral violation is qualified by a profound compassion for the 
anguished Ignorance at its base, and by a fundamental longing for reconciliation. 
     The moral-spiritual status of most human beings, however, is more ambiguous. Such 
ambiguity, again, is a function of our Ignorance; an Ignorance that is more a function of moral 
and spiritual immaturity than of willful perversity. As Schopenhauer notes, the ego’s sense of 
self-enclosure is a natural human condition; it is only the exceptional human being who 
transcends this to any great degree. Nevertheless, most of us can acknowledge the validity of 
ego-transcending moral principles even when we are not spontaneously inclined to prioritize 
them above our egoic wants and needs.  
     In this respect, we might identify three moral-spiritual states human beings can occupy. The 
first is the state of egoism pure and simple. The pure egoist lives by the law of her own separate 
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interests. The pure egoist doesn’t necessarily mistreat others, nor is egoism inconsistent with 
generosity, but the pure egoist’s treatment of others is entirely conditioned by her interest in her 
own well-being (although she may not admit this to herself or others).  
     Next is what we might call the person of justice. The just person is egoistic by inclination but 
acknowledges, and strives to live in accordance with, the moral principles of selfless (i.e., ego-
transcending) regard for others. Unlike the pure egoist, the just person is able and willing to act 
against his own private interests when he recognizes that this is what justice demands.  Perhaps 
the fullest philosophical expression of this is to be found in the ethics of Kant.  Most human 
beings, it seems, range between pure egoism and justice.  
     Finally, though, there is the theonomous person. The theonomous person’s egoic inclinations 
are so fully informed by her experience of unity with others that her own satisfaction comes, 
principally, from the exercise of concern for them. These are the few saints among us. Paul’s 
epistles proclaim that faith in Christ will itself transform us into such theonomous individuals. 
Alas, the actual history of Christianity suggests that it is not quite as simple as that.  
     Indeed, if we posit a continuum of moral-spiritual maturation, with pure egoism at one end 
and theonomy at the other, we might recognize the need for different religious approaches for 
each of these different stages in moral-spiritual development. 
     For the pure egoist, a transcendent God of disciplinary power, who rewards good behavior 
and punishes bad, seems necessary to reign in the excesses of egoism and direct the egoist 
toward justice. The pure egoist, motivated solely by self-interest, will only be moved by a God 
whose power threatens his interest in a basic way. For such a one, a God of judgment, threat, and 
reward, seems necessary.    
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     For the just person, who longs for a theonomy she hasn’t yet achieved, a benevolent God of 
love and promise seems more appropriate. The just person also seeks reward, but it is the reward 
of overcoming egoism itself, of entering upon the Unity underlying separation. In other words, it 
is the reward of becoming fully theonomous.   
     Finally, the theonomous person experiences God as an immanent presence that opens her up 
to the Unity that underlies all things.  The theonomous person lives within this presence, this 
“eternal now,” that is its own reward. Her principle desire is for the healing and restoration of the 
divided world.  
     In the biblical portrayal of God, we can discern all three of these divine representations – the 
God of disciplinary power, the God of loving promise, and the God of unitive immanence – 
superimposed upon one another, so to speak. It is as if the biblical authors present us with 
differing portraits of God in response to these different levels of spiritual maturation.    
  
VIII. Conclusion: The Fire of Hell 
     All of this allows us, finally, a fuller reflection on what Jesus may have meant in proclaiming 
that “Anyone who says to another ‘you fool’ is in danger of the fire of hell.”  The word translated 
hell here is gehenna, which originally referred to the valley of Hinnom, a valley outside of 
Jerusalem where refuse was burnt. It is an expression that suggests a place of abandonment, 
expulsion, exclusion, isolation. It is where the worthless are thrown away.     
     Jesus seems to be saying that it is we who throw each other away as a result of our egoic 
disregard for one another. In our efforts to prop ourselves up at the expense of others we consign 
each other to gehenna; i.e., to the anguish of isolation and exclusion that prevents us from 
experiencing the Unity we so long for. It is our protest against this feeling of being ‘thrown 
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away’ that lies at the heart of moral offense, and that leads us to seek to throw the other away in 
turn.   
     And in this way, as we see, the response of moral offense is paradoxical; for at the same time 
that it reflects our need to be united with others it undermines our ability to satisfy that need. My 
offense at you triggers your offense at me, and there we remain, suspended in offense, unable to 
achieve the love whose violation so offends us.  
     We may best look upon the phenomenon of moral offense, then, as but a seed, a germ, of 
something more sublime. Jesus, Buddha, and all the great spiritual sages call on us to pursue this 
higher sublimity, to follow the mystical element in moral offense to a place beyond offense 
itself: to apology, forgiveness, repentance, reconciliation, and through these, finally, to the repair 
and healing of our fractured relations.           
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